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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the issue . . .is fraught with complexity and encompasses the
interests of law, both civil and criminal, medical ethics and so-
cial morality, [and] it is not one which is well suited for resolu-
tion in an adversary judicial proceeding. It is the type [of] issue
which is more suitably addressed in the legislative forum, where
fact finding can be less confined and the viewpoint of all inter-
ested institutions and discipline can be presented and
synthesized. "1
Although it may be correct to conclude that the issue is appropri-
ate for legislative resolution, the supreme court itself has noted
elsewhere that "in the absence of appropriate legislative action [to
provide the ways and means of enforcing constitutional rights] it is
the responsibility of the courts to do so."''4 Thus, in light of the
failure of the Florida Legislature to enact right-to-die legislation,
the supreme court could have and should have promulgated guide-
lines for physicians and hospitals to follow in future situations like
Perlmutter's. A judicial rule, rather than a case-by-case approach,
would have avoided the practical effect of Perlmutter which will
require physicians and hospitals to seek judicial approval each
time a patient refuses to continue life-saving treatment-or face
potential civil and criminal liability if the decendent's estate or the
state attorney later disagrees with the physician's response to his
patient's request.
JOSEPH D. WASIL
The Right to Counsel in Child Dependency
Proceedings: Conflict Between Florida and
the Fifth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
cently handed down a decision in direct conflict with a decision
made by the Supreme Court of Florida only ten months earlier. In
Davis v. Page' the Fifth Circuit held that indigent parents have an
41. Id.
42. Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n. v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla.
1972).
1. No. 78-2063 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1980). Davis filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court of Florida to regain custody of her child from the State De-
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absolute right to counsel in child dependency proceedings and that
the court must appoint counsel for them unless they knowingly
and intelligently waive the right. This decision directly conflicts
with the holding of the Supreme Court of Florida in Potvin v. Kel-
ler,' a decision reaffirmed in In re D.B. & D.S.3 shortly before the
Fifth Circuit decided Davis.
Since Potvin v. Keller,' Florida courts have followed a case-
by-case method for the determination of the right to counsel in
child dependency proceedings, a method originally devised by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cleaver v. Wilcox.' The Cleaver
court had identified three critical factors a judge must examine in
determining whether to appoint counsel: the length of the poten-
tial parent-child separation, the presence or absence of parental
consent or of disputed facts, and the particular case's complexity
as it affects parental comprehension of evidence and examination
of witnesses.'
In D.B. & D.S., the Supreme Court of Florida held that there
is no fundamental right to counsel in dependency proceedings; due
process requires appointed counsel only when parents risk perma-
nently losing custody or incurring criminal charges. In all other cir-
cumstances, the right depends on a case-by-case application of the
Potvin test.' Moreover, the court ordered Florida's state courts to
disregard the district court's decision in Davis, which recognized
an absolute right to counsel in such circumstances, and to follow
the D.B. & D.S. opinion. 8
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services. She had not had counsel at the dependency
adjudication. After the supreme court denied her petition, Davis brought a class action in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, on behalf of all indi-
gent parents, seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory ruling that the state had to provide
them with counsel. The district court entered summary judgment for Davis and held that
due process requires the state to provide counsel for indigent parents. 442 F. Supp. 258
(S.D. Fla. 1977). A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the summary judgment and remanded for a determination of whether attorney's fees
could be awarded. 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980). On rehearing en banc, the court of appeals
affirmed the summary judgment, vacated the injunction entered by the district court, and
reversed the award of attorney's fees. No. 78-2063, slip op. at 5059.
2. 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975).
3. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
4. The Potvin test derives from Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974). See
note 7 infra.
5. 385 So. 2d at 87.
6. 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975).
7. 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974). Until Davis, only the Ninth Circuit had addressed this
question.
8. Id. at 945.
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By subsequently affirming the district court's position in Da-
vis, thereby rejecting Florida's case-by-case approach and requir-
ing the appointment of counsel for indigents in all child depen-
dency proceedings, the Fifth Circuit continued a conflict
apparently not welcomed by the Supreme Court of Florida. The
Davis decision heralds an extension of the constitutional right to
counsel in the Fifth Circuit, a right previously confined almost ex-
clusively to criminal and quasi-criminal cases. 9
The Supreme Court of Florida, in In re D.B. & D.S., 10 chal-
lenged the intervention of the United States District Court in Da-
vis. The court reasoned that the right to counsel established by the
United States Supreme Court applies solely in criminal or quasi-
criminal cases. The right flows from the sixth amendment, not the
fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process. This constitu-
tional analysis is the key to the court's holding. Since "[t]he extent
of procedural due process protections varies with the character of
the interest and the nature of the proceeding involved,"1 the court
rejected the district court's holding in Davis and ruled that under
the Cleaver test, courts should appoint counsel only when perma-
nent termination of parental custody might result or when the pro-
ceedings might lead to criminal charges for child abuse. When
"there is no threat of permanent termination of parental custody,
the test should be applied on a case-by-case basis." 2
The Supreme Court of Florida supported its case-by-case ap-
proach by drawing an analogy between the custody issues in de-
pendency matters and in domestic relation proceedings. 8 Neither
proceeding is criminal. The supreme court also distinguished de-
pendency proceedings from delinquency proceedings. Whereas the
purpose of dependency proceedings is "to protect and care for the
child," 4 the emphasis in delinquency proceedings is on punish-
ment. The court thus rejected the district court's comparison of
9. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel for petit offenses
whenever imprisonment possible); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to counsel in juvenile
delinquency proceeding exists when commitment for criminal conduct is at issue); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent criminal defendant facing imprisonment for a
noncapital offense has a right to counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (indigent
criminal defendant in capital case is entitled to counsel). See also Comment, The Indigent
Parent's Right to Appointed Counsel in Actions to Terminate Parental Rights, 43 U. CINN.
L. REv. 635 (1979).
10. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
11. Id. at 89 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
12. Id. at 91.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 90.
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the right to counsel in In re Gault,1 5 a delinquency proceeding,
with the right to counsel in dependency proceedings.
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, focused on the complex-
ity of the child-dependency hearing process in determining that in-
digent parents have a right to counsel. The court considered the
complexity of the dependency proceeding in terms of "procedural,
evidentiary, and substantive law."1 In addition, the court reasoned
that the unrepresented parent would confront all of the state's re-
sources, because the state would use social workers, psychologists,
and highly experienced counsel.17 The court determined that these
factors made it highly likely that the state would erroneously de-
prive an unrepresented indigent parent of his child. 18
Another factor that persuaded the Fifth Circuit that depen-
dency proceedings require appointment of counsel was the parent's
burden of proof to show that returning the child to his home is in
the child's best interests.19 The court noted that "evidence which
was not legally sufficient to support a finding of dependency may
nonetheless be sufficient to refuse a return of the child to its [sic]
parents."' 0 If a court adjudicates a child a dependent, its options
range from allowing the child to remain in his own or a relative's
home under supervision, to permanently committing the child to a
state agency.'1 The Fifth Circuit considered that a "temporary"
loss might continue until the child reaches majority.12 If a parent
may indeed lose a child for that length of time, then the loss may
be "permanent" for the purpose of deciding whether the court
should appoint counsel.'s
The state had urged that the Fifth Circuit adopt the case-by-
case method set forth in Gagnon v. Scarpelli.24 The Court in Ga-
gnon had applied a case-by-case method in probation hearings, re-
jecting it for criminal trials. The state's analogy to Gagnon, failed,
however, because the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the limited due
15. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. 618 F.2d at 380. See No. 78-2063, slip op. at 5057.
17. 618 F.2d at 380; No. 78-2063, slip op. at 5057.
18. 618 F.2d at 381 n.6.
19. Id. at 380. The parent cannot relitigate the adjudication of dependency in a disposi-
tion hearing but must show that restoration of custody is in the child's best interest because
of subsequent developments. Id.
20. Id. at 381 (citing Pendarvis v. State, 104 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)).
21. Id. at 380. See also 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 99, 107 (1980).
22. Id. at 376 (construing FLA. STAT. §§ 39.10(4) and 39.11 (1)(c) (1977). See 1978 Fla.
Laws ch. 78-414 (revising FLA. STAT. ch. 39 (1977)).
23. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
24. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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process rights of prisoners had colored the Gagnon ruling. When
the rights at issue are "among the most fundamental and basic of
those guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment," 5 a case-by-case
approach is inappropriate. According to the Fifth Circuit, an abso-
lute right to appointed counsel exists in child dependency proceed-
ings because of the critical nature of the rights adjudicated in such
cases.
One may well conclude that the Fifth Circuit's approach to
child dependency proceedings probes more deeply into the require-
ments of the due process clause than does the Florida analysis. But
unless the Supreme Court of Florida eventually accepts the Fifth
Circuit's position, or until the Supreme Court of the United States
resolves the issue, the two jurisdictions remain in conflict on the
question of right to counsel in dependency matters.
GEORGE DORSETT
Dormant Commerce Clause Revisited:
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.
The extent of permissible state regulation of interstate com-
merce under the "dormant" commerce clause has troubled the Su-
preme Court of the United States ever since Chief Justice Marshall
interpreted the clause as a limitation on the states.1 The Supreme
Court has recognized, however, that certain state regulations may
be matters of local concern, legitimately within the state's police
power.' Because of the peculiarly local nature of highway safety
regulations, for example, the Court traditionally has cloaked them
with a "strong presumption of validity." Despite this presump-
tion, the Supreme Court in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp.,4 held that an Iowa statute prohibiting trucks longer than
fifty-five feet from traveling its roads imposed an unconstitutional
25. 618 F.2d at 384. See No. 78-2063, slip op. at 5058 n.8.
1. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-222 (1824). For an excellent discussion
of Marshall's view of the commerce clause, see F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WHITE (1937).
2. Health and consumer protection, for example, are matters of local concern. See, e.g.,
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 351 (1977).
3. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959).
4. 101 S. Ct. 1309 (1981).
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